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Abstract 
Previous research on central bank independence has used indices as a measure of 
independence.  This technique implicitly assumes that all aspects of independence 
have similar effects on macroeconomic variables.  Statistical tests show that some 
aspects of independence reduce the inflation rate and inflation variance, while 
others do not.  This result confirms that indices are inadequate for measuring 
independence.  The effects of independence appear to be significant in the short 
run, but insignificant in the long run.   
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There is no subtler surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to 
debauch the currency.  The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law 
on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million 
is able to diagnose. 
 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequence of the Peace 
 
 
 Two goals of any country’s economic policy should be high employment and stable 
prices.  The reasons for wanting high employment should be obvious; the more people that are 
working, the more output and income a country has.  The reasons for wanting price stability are 
less obvious.  Though certain parties might benefit from falling prices, just as others might 
benefit from rising prices, the uncertainty associated with fluctuating prices reduces the incentive 
for business and consumers to take risks.  In most modern economies, the task of ensuring price 
stability falls to a central bank, the sole issuer of a country’s legal tender currency.  In exchange 
for the right to issue currency, governments demand a certain amount influence over the bank’s 
business, if not outright ownership.  Thus, central banks are usually concerned both with 
promoting the general economic welfare their country, which includes both stabilizing prices and 
increasing employment. 
 However, the Phillips curve suggests that central banks cannot achieve both of these 
goals simultaneously.  Loose monetary policy, which encourages high employment, means 
accepting high inflation.  Tight monetary policy, which encourages price stability, restricts 
employment growth.  Therefore, central banks must resist the temptation to increase employment 
by creating surprise inflation if they are to keep prices stable.   
 If monetary policy were run by a pure democracy, voters would prefer a loose policy with 
high inflation and low unemployment because they recognize the immediate and tangible 
benefits of higher output more easily than the less perceptible costs of inflation.  Additionally, 
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those who gain from the redistributive effects of inflation outnumber those who lose.  In the long 
run, unfortunately, such a policy is not what is best for social welfare. 
 Several researchers have developed solutions to this inflationary bias inherent in 
monetary policy.  Most have suggested governments delegate the responsibility for monetary 
policy to an independent central bank.  Since an independent central bank does not face political 
pressure to create inflation, it should pursue a monetary policy that balances output stabilization 
with price stabilization. 
 Furthermore, theory contends that an institutional structure that enhances the central 
bank’s independence should give its policies more credibility.  If a central bank’s policies are not 
credible, the public will revise their price expectations only after the central bank takes action 
against inflation and slows the economy.  When an independent central bank proclaims that it 
intends to stop inflation, the public should believe the statement and adjust their inflation 
expectations accordingly.  Thus, the credibility obtained from independence allows the central 
bank to keep inflation low with lower costs in terms of forgone output. 
 While most researchers agree that independence is theoretically desirable, they disagree 
as to what constitutes independence in practice. Empirically, researchers have measured central 
bank independence (CBI) by creating an index that based on how each central bank relates to its 
national government.  Characteristics that reflect independence increase the index’s score. While 
these studies examine one or more aspects of independence, none of them can definitively say 
that what they measure completely constitutes independence, because creating a CBI index is an 
inherently subjective process.  A researcher’s bias will naturally affect the way in which his 
index measures independence.  Consequently, studies that use an index to measure independence 
might produce skewed results.   
4
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 Most indices count the number of aspects of independence present in a central bank’s 
charter and add them together.  This technique implicitly assumes that each aspect contributes 
equally to the effect of independence on macroeconomic variables.  I contend that there is no 
reason to make this assumption.  Certain aspects of independence are bound to have a greater or 
lesser effect than others.  Thus, the proper method for analyzing independence is to examine 
each aspect independently 
Creating an index requires making a subjective determination, before analysis, of the 
relative weights of the components of independence; my approach will determine the weights of 
the components based on this analysis. The results of this paper should provide a more accurate 
picture of how independence affects macroeconomic variables than past research.  It should also 
indicate which institutional features of central bank independence would be the most desirable 
features to include in a central bank’s charter, i.e. have the greatest effect on inflation and the 
least effect on the real macroeconomic variables. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature on central bank independence can be divided into three categories: theoretical 
papers, empirical papers, and critiques of empirical methods.  In this section, I will summarize 
the important findings from each category of the literature. 
Most authors, when writing about central bank independence distinguish between certain 
types of independence.  Following Debelle and Fisher (1996), the most common distinction is 
between goal independence and instrument independence.  Goal independence gives a central 
bank the ability to chose the final goals of monetary policy.  Instrument independence gives a 
central bank the ability to decide the instruments it will use to pursue the final goals of monetary 
policy.  Goal and instrument independence each address a different aspect of the inflationary bias 
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– goal independence takes the choice of the inflation rate out of the public’s hands while 
instrument independence allows a bank to pursue its chosen inflation rate consistently across 
time. 
Rogoff (1985) shows that, when policy is conducted under full discretion, a central 
banker with the same preferences as society at large will enact a suboptimal policy because of 
the labor market distortion across time periods.  However, if the central banker emphasizes 
stabilizing inflation more than stabilizing employment relative to society at large, he will 
improve social welfare, defined as minimizing the variations from the predetermined price level 
and employment level.  But, the central banker should not focus exclusively on maintaining a 
consistent price level because shocks would pass through entirely to employment.  In a similar 
analysis, Faust (1996) achieves the same result with a central bank board whose preferences are 
more inflation-averse than society at large.   
In Rogoff’s model, the central bank is assumed to exogenously prefer price level 
stabilization more than employment stabilization.  Walsh (1995) develops a contract that the 
government can offer a central bank governor with preferences that are the same as society’s that 
would realign his preferences to mirror the inflation-averse banker in Rogoff’s model.  The 
optimal contract offers the governor incentives contingent on price level.  Incentives for the 
central bank governor can take many forms ranging from financial remuneration for a job well 
done to dismissal for poor performance.  In order to be enforceable, the contract must induce the 
central bank to choose a monetary growth rate that is consistent with its publicly available 
signals about inflation.  Rogoff and Walsh both focus on ways to reduce the variation from 
specified targets by increasing the bank’s commitment to carrying out its planned actions. 
6
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Posen (1993, 1995) examines central bank independence as part of the political process.  
In his model, central bank policy preferences will vary based on the amount of political support 
the central bank receives from anti-inflationary factions and the amount of financial sector 
opposition to inflation. The chief function of independence is not to make monetary policy time-
consistent, but to increase the financial sector’s influence in the ongoing policy debate.  With 
empirical evidence as support, Posen contends that financial opposition to inflation is highest in 
countries with universal banking, with central banks that have little regulation over the financial 
sector, with a fractionalized party system, and/or with a federal system of government.  To put it 
in terms of goal and instrument independence, Posen’s argument is that political support for the 
goal of low inflation is necessary; instrument independence alone cannot guarantee a low overall 
inflation rate. 
Though the consensus in the literature supports the inflationary bias, the case is not 
ironclad.  The strongest critique of the inflationary bias comes from McCallum (1995).  
Realistically, if the central bank were to continually proclaim its intention to disinflate and then 
inflate, the public would become wise to the charade. Once the public expects the bank to inflate, 
the central bank cannot create surprise inflation and the increase in employment and GDP that 
comes with it. Thus, the bank would have no reason to inflate.  However, McCallum’s critique 
applies only to one of the motivations behind the inflationary bias.  While it does support the 
idea that central banks are not likely to behave inconsistently with respect to time, central bank 
independence still remains an effective counterweight to the inflationary demands of society at 
large. In other words, if McCallum’s critique is correct, instrument independence will have no 
effect on lowering the overall inflation rate, but goal independence may still have an effect.  
7
Sheppard: The Components of Central Bank Independence and Their Effects
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2008
The Components of Central Bank Independence and Their Effects 
 6
Empirical studies on the link between central bank independence and inflation have had 
mixed results.  Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) compiled two indices to measure 
independence – one for political independence (similar to goal independence) and one for 
economic independence (similar to instrument independence).  Banks whose governors and 
board were not appointed by the government, whose policy meetings were not required to 
involve the government, whose charters contained an explicit provision for price stability, and 
who have a procedure for mediating disputes with the government have greater political 
independence.  Banks who have control over the discount rate, who control the rate, amount, and 
length of loans to the government, and who have supervision over the banking industry have 
greater economic independence.  The authors found that lower and less variable inflation was 
associated with higher independence, but that there was no association between independence 
and any real macroeconomic variables.  Alesina and Summers (1993) combine the Grilli et al. 
index with one created by Bade and Parkin (1982) and find a similar result. 
Fuhrer (1997) runs another empirical test on the link between central bank independence 
and inflation using the indices mentioned above, as well as the Cukierman (1992) index, and 
accounts for variations in real macroeconomic variables across countries and across time.  His 
results show no significant correlation between independence and inflation.  Additionally, he 
finds no significant relationship between independence and inflation variability, real growth, and 
unemployment.  He notes that most central banks were able to disinflate during the 1980’s 
without changes in their institutional structures.  
In fact, diverging results such as these are common in literature on central bank 
independence.  Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) summarize, compare, and critique notable papers 
on the subject.  They found that authors used a wide variety of variables to measure 
8
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independence, interpreted bank laws in different ways, and used a number of different techniques 
to analyze data.  Mangano (1998) quantified the difference between the Cukierman and Grilli et 
al. indices.  He found that about one third of the components of the respective indices disagreed 
about how to measure the same variable.  While both indices both included a large number of 
components, each index leaves out about 40% of the components considered important by the 
other.  With such a wide disagreement in two of the most prominent measurements of 
independence, it is no wonder that there has been such a wide disagreement in empirical studies.   
Mangano argues that regressions that use the country rankings produced by an index 
should produce better results than ones that use index values because the rankings are less 
affected by the specific details of each index.  Using a regression based on rankings, he finds that 
higher independence is associated with lower inflation and no significant (though likely 
negative) association between independence and growth.   
To summarize, studies on central bank independence are sensitive to issues related to the 
complexity and unclear nature of independence itself.  Because it is difficult to discern between 
varying degrees of independence, measurements of independence need to be as clearly defined as 
possible.  Any analysis of independence should also take note of the different types of 
independence because each type should have different effects on real variables.  Additionally, 
within each type of independence, the institutional features will not necessarily have a uniform 
effect on real variables.  Thus, an effective study on central bank independence should make 
sufficient accommodations for the complexity of the issue at hand. 
THEORY 
 
 Following Rogoff (1985), my model of how central bank independence affects policy 
decisions is based on a rational expectations IS-LM model of the economy.  In this model, firms 
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and laborers negotiate wages a period in advance.  They choose a wage such that it will be 
consistent with their expectations about the future price level.  The wage increase for period t 
will be set high enough “so that, in the absence of disturbances, the central bank will not choose 
to inflate the money supply beyond the point consistent with wage setters’ desired real wage” 
(1174). 
 The central bank policy is assumed to minimize the social loss function, 
 t = (nt  n*)2 + ( t  *)2 , 
where nt and t are the level of employment and inflation, respectively, at time t, n* and * are the 
socially desired levels of employment and inflation, and  is the relative weight society places on 
inflation stability to employment stability.  In order to minimize the social loss function, the 
central bank must choose a money supply that induces the employment and inflation levels that 
are closest to what is socially desired.  The central bank’s task would be easy, were it not for a 
random supply shock at time t, which distorts the state of the economy and requires the bank to 
adjust policy in order to bring it in line with the social ideal.   
 The public is presumed to prefer a level of employment that is higher than the actual 
level, which means that the central bank can reduce the employment component of the social loss 
function by raising the actual level.  The socially desired rate of inflation is generally, though not 
necessarily, low, such that the central bank, more often than not, can reduce the inflation 
component of the social loss function by reducing the rate of inflation. However, the Phillips 
curve suggests that there is a short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.  Therefore, 
if the central bank wants to increase employment (reduce unemployment), it must accept a 
higher rate of inflation.  Reducing one component of the social loss function necessarily means 
increasing the other. 
10
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 Because wage-setters choose a wage based on predictions about the future price level, 
any increase in employment at time t will not occur in time t+1, unless the price level increases 
more than anticipated.  Thus, the marginal cost of stabilizing employment in terms of 
destabilizing inflation increases over time.  However, if the price level remains closer to the 
socially desired level, then employment will adapt on its own to the changes in price level.  In 
other words, stabilizing inflation does not require increasing marginal costs in terms of 
destabilizing employment over time.  Thus, a central bank that stabilizes inflation can improve 
social welfare. 
 Goal independence and instrument independence have different effects on final policy 
because they affect different components of the social loss function.  Goal independence gives 
the central bank, not the public, the ability to choose n
*
 and *, the goal rates of employment and 
inflation, as well as , how much policy prefers the inflation rate to be closer to its goal than the 
employment rate. It gives the bank the ability to decide the final targets for inflation and 
employment; it does not necessarily increase the bank’s ability to hit those targets.  Goal 
independence should be associated with lower overall inflation rates because it removes policy 
decisions from the hands of those who would want higher inflation.  Goal independence, because 
it is associated with lower average inflation and lower average growth in the money supply, 
should also be associated with a lower average real GDP growth and higher unemployment.   
 On the other hand, instrument independence makes it easier for the bank to choose the nt 
and t, the actual rates of inflation and unemployment.  It improves the bank’s accuracy in hitting 
its targets; it does not let the bank decide what the target should be.  Because a bank with 
instrument independence, but not goal independence, will not achieve a low average rate of 
inflation so long as society wants it to be high, instrument independence should not be associated 
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with lower average inflation rates.  Instrument independence allows the bank, not the public, to 
decide how the effects of a supply shock are divided between employment and inflation.  Given 
the model above, the optimal strategy for a central bank is to focus on reducing the inflation rate 
variance and to allow the labor market to correct itself. Therefore, instrument independence 
should be associated with lower inflation variance.  Instrument independence should not be 
associated with real GDP growth or unemployment because it only affects inflation variance 
around the socially determined level.   
MODEL 
 To avoid the potential pitfalls associated with measuring central bank independence with 
an index, my model will consider each aspect of independence separately.  As much as possible, 
I will refrain from making arbitrary decisions that might affect the meaning of each component 
of independence. In such cases where variables can be measured numerically, I will do so.  For 
example, I will measure the length of a governor’s term in years, rather than pick an arbitrary 
length and consider longer terms to signify independence and shorter term not to signify 
independence.  In cases where numerical measurement does not apply, I will try to define my 
variables on a binomial basis, i.e. either the aspect is present or it is not.  For example, 
Cukierman (1992) tries to create a hierarchy to measure the effect on independence of explicit 
provisions for price stability, saying that an explicit provision for price stability alone is more 
independent than a provision for price stability and a conflicting goal, which is more independent 
than no provision for price stability.  In my model, each category of price stability would 
constitute its own variable.  
12
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 The following variables will be included in my model.  With each variable, I will explain 
why it contributes to independence and how I expect to measure it.  Each variable will be 
interpreted in such a way that its presence (value=1) will indicate independence. 
Goal Independence Variables 
 Explicit provision for price stability, as determined by the bank (PSTBK): An explicit 
provision for price stability in a central bank’s charter should give it justification for maintaining 
low inflation.  PSTBK will be 1 if a there is an explicit provision for price stability without a 
specific inflation target and no provision for a conflicting goal in a bank’s charter or if there is a 
specific target determined by the bank and no conflicting goal.  If there is a provision for price 
stability along with a conflicting goal, such as high growth, or no mention of price stability, 
PSTBK will be 0. 
 Explicit provision for price stability, as determined by the government (PSTGT): In cases 
where the definition of price stability is provided by the government as an inflation target, 
PSTGT will be 1.  If not, it will be 0. This case is separated from PSTBK because the bank does 
not have full control over policy goals, but, because price stability is still listed as a goal, the 
government cannot choose an inflation target that is too high. PSTGT and PSTBK will never 
both be 1. 
 Governor appointed by bank owners (GAPBK):  The government, if given the chance to 
appoint the central bank governor, should look for an individual who shares its preferences about 
the relative importance of inflation and employment stabilization.  The central bank’s 
shareholders and the rest of the banking community should prefer a governor who is more 
hawkish towards inflation.  Thus, GAPBK will be 1 if the governor is appointed entirely by 
private interests and 0 if otherwise. 
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 Governor appointed by bank and government together (GAPMX):  Governors appointed 
by the bank shareholders with approval of the government, by the government from a list of 
names produced by the bank, or by another mix of private and public interests should have goals 
which are different from purely private goals or purely public goals.  When public and private 
interests have a check on each other in nominating the governor, candidates who prefer extreme 
price stability or extremely high levels of employment should get screened out.  Thus, GAPMX 
will be 1 if the governor is appointed by a mix of private and public interests and 0 otherwise.  
GAPBK and GAPMX will never both be 1. 
 Board appointed by the bank owners (BAPBK): The criteria for BAPBK is the same as 
for GAPBK, except it applies to the members of the bank committee that actively manages 
monetary policy.  In cases where the government appoints some, but not all members of the 
board, BAPBK will be the percentage of board seats that are not appointed by the government.  
If all of the board seats are appointed by the bank, then BAPBK will be 1. 
 Board appointed by bank and government together (BAPMX):  The criteria for BAPMX 
is the similar to those for GAPMX, except it applies to the members of the bank committee that 
actively manages monetary policy. 
Instrument Independence Variables 
Management Variables 
 Governor’s term length (GTERM): Policy is more likely to be consistent while a 
particular governor is in office.  Thus, the longer each governor stays in office, the more 
consistent policy will be across time.  GTERM will be measured by the number of years legally 
specified to be the governor’s term. 
14
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 Governor’s turnover rate (GTURN): Though a governor may be legally allowed a certain 
term length, he might not always serve out his entire term, especially if the government is able to 
dismiss him.  In regressions using average data, GTURN will be measured as the average 
number of years actually served by the governors.  In regressions using yearly data, GTURN will 
be the number of years the current governor has served in office. 
 Board term length (BTERM): Similar criteria as for GTERM. 
 Board turnover rate (BTURN): Similar criteria as for GTURN. 
Policy Variables 
 Governor dismissal procedure (GDISS):  If the government has the ability to dismiss the 
central bank governor before his term is complete, then the governor cannot formulate policy 
that is too distasteful to the government.  GDISS will be 1 if the governor cannot be dismissed by 
the government and 0 otherwise. 
 Policy formulation without government involvement (PFMID):  If the government 
participates in regular policy meetings (e.g. the treasury secretary has a seat on the board), then 
policy will lean towards the government’s preferences.  PFMID will be 1 if regular policy 
meetings are completely independent from government influence and 0 otherwise. 
 Policy formed with a government representative as a non-voting member (PFMNV): 
When the government participates in regular policy meetings as a non-voting member, its 
influence is greater than if it were not involved at all, but less than if it had an official vote.  
When a government representative participates in regular policy meetings as a non-voting 
member, PFMNV will be 1.  It will be 0 otherwise.  PFMNV and PFMID will never both be 1. 
15
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 Policy approval (PPROV):  If the government has final approval over monetary policy, 
the central bank cannot enact policy that is distasteful to the government.  PPROV will be 1 if 
the government does not have final approval over policy and 0 otherwise. 
Government Financing Variables 
 Terms of lending to the government (LMAND, LRATE, LTIME, LSIZE): If the central 
bank is constrained in the way in which it lends to the government and finances its debt, it does 
not have full control over the growth of the money supply.  For a bank to be independent, it must 
not mandatorily finance government debt.  It must also lend to the government at a market rate, 
for a specified amount of time, and for a limited amount.  LMAND, LRATE, LTIME, and 
LSIZE will be 1 if there exist constraints on lending in their respective categories and 0 
otherwise. 
 Because goal independence and instrument independence have different effects on bank 
policy, the ways in which they affect macroeconomic variables will differ as well.  I will now 
outline how I expect the independent variables to affect the dependent variables across the 
several regressions.  Regardless of the dependent variable, each regression will have the same 
format: all of the independent variables are assumed to linearly affect the dependent variable, as 
shown below. 
DEPVARt = 0 + 1PSTBK + 2PSTGT + 3GAPBK + 4GAPMX +
5BAPBK + 6BAPMX + 7GTERM + 8GTURN + 9BTERM +
10BTURN + 11PFMID+ 12PFMNV + 13PPROV + 14LMAND+
15LRATE + 16LSIZE + 17LTIME + t
 
Inflation Rate 
 The goal of the process that determines monetary policy, which includes the public, the 
government, and the central bank, is to determine what the rate of inflation should be.  Central 
banks with goal independence would be expected to choose a lower inflation rate than those who 
16
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are subject to political control because the greater public, which generally prefers high inflation 
and low unemployment, is removed from this process.  There should be a significant negative 
correlation between goal independence variables and the overall inflation rate.  I would expect 
instrument independence variables to have a negative association as well because instrument 
independence lowers the inflation rate in order to bring it closer to its target. Instrument 
independence might not be significant because a bank with instrument independence but not goal 
independence might be given an inflation target that is still high.   
Inflation Variance 
 The variance of the inflation rate, i.e. how often the inflation rate changes, should be 
negatively associated with independence variables.  Goal independence should not be 
significantly associated with inflation variance.  If there were an association, it would most likely 
be positive, because goal independence increases the divergence between the bank’s goals and 
popular goals.  I will run three regressions corresponding to different possible inflation targets – 
one using the sample variance; one using the variance around 2%, a common inflation target; and 
one around 0%, i.e. absolute price stability.   
GDP Growth 
 In the IS-LM model, increases in the money supply, ceteris paribus, lead to increases in 
output.  Thus, goal independence, because it is associated with lower overall inflation and lower 
overall growth in the money supply, should be associated with lower average real GDP growth.  
Instrument independence, because it is not associated with any absolute level of growth in the 
money supply, should not be associated with real GDP growth. 
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Unemployment 
 According to the Phillips curve, the unemployment rate is negatively associated with the 
inflation rate in the short run, but not in the long run.  Goal independence, because it allows a 
central bank to choose a lower inflation rate and therefore a higher unemployment rate, should be 
positively and significantly associated with unemployment in the short run.  Instrument 
independence, because it only affects how close the actual inflation rate is to its target should not 
necessarily be associated with unemployment in the short run.  If it is always the case that the 
actual inflation rate is higher than the target rate, then instrument independence will reduce 
inflation and therefore increase unemployment.  In the long run, because the labor market 
corrects to the natural rate of employment, which is determined by factors other than the 
independence of the central bank, neither goal nor instrument independence should be associated 
with unemployment in the long run.  
 Data on the aspects of central bank independence comes from central bank charters, 
statutes, constitutions and websites.  Data on the inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, and 
unemployment rate comes from the International Monetary Fund.  The data is available for the 
years 1980-2006.  During the time period, many of the central banks included in the sample 
made major changes to their charters that enhanced the bank’s independence, as a response to the 
initial papers on central bank independence and in order to conform with the regulations of the 
European System of Central Banks.  In the final few years of the sample, the European Central 
Bank conducts monetary policy for countries in the Eurozone.  The changes in independence that 
occur during the time period should provide good contrast between banks with and without 
independence.   
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RESULTS 
Yearly Data 
 Since all seventeen of the independent variables are attempting to measure the same 
thing, namely independence, it is not surprising that the full regression exhibits high 
multicolinearity.  Table 1 shows the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores and tolerances for 
each variable.   
Table 1. – Variance Inflation Factors and Tolerances 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
bapbk 17.70 0.056488 
pstgt 12.23 0.081733 
ltime 10.75 0.092995 
bapmx 10.41 0.096063 
pstbk 7.53 0.132776 
pprov 7.31 0.136787 
lmand 7.09 0.141093 
pfmid 6.28 0.159148 
bterm 5.68 0.175938 
gapmx 5.63 0.177657 
lsize 5.12 0.195198 
gdiss 4.58 0.218501 
gterm 3.62 0.276438 
lrate 3.20 0.312059 
pfmnv 2.97 0.336844 
gapbk 2.08 0.48006 
gturn 1.29 0.778116 
   
Mean VIF 6.68  
 
Eleven out of seventeen independent variables have VIF scores over 5, which is sufficient to 
indicate that colinearity among those variables will make it difficult to properly estimate their 
coefficients.  Perhaps this problem with multicolinearity is why previous researchers chose to 
aggregate the aspects into an index. 
 However, simply because there is multicolinearity between the independent variables 
does not mean that their effects cannot be properly estimated.  While each variable can be 
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predicted by the sum of the others, each variable is not well explained by any single variable.  
Table 2 summarizes the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for each pair of 
independent variables.  For the complete table, see the appendix. 
Table 2. – Correlation Coefficients of Independent Variables 
Absolute Value Number 
0.00-0.09 40 
0.10-0.19 43 
0.20-0.29 29 
0.30-0.39 12 
0.40-0.49 5 
0.50-0.59 5 
0.60-0.69 2 
 
Clearly, most variables are uncorrelated with each other.  Even among variables that are more 
significantly correlated, the absolute value of the correlation is less than the guideline value for 
multicolinearity of 0.8.  This is most likely because a country that wishes to have an independent 
central bank will give it many aspects of independence.  Thus, each aspect of independence is 
likely to be accompanied by several others.  However, because there are many ways in which a 
government can make a central bank independent, each individual aspect is not particularly 
correlated with any other. 
 I expect that the sources of multicolinearity come from three main groups.  First, some 
aspects of independence are measured by two variables (price stability, governor and board 
appointments, and policy formation).  I originally planned to have one variable to measure each 
of these aspects.  But, after examining several central bank charters, I found organizational 
structures that I thought might have a significant effect, but not quite the same as structures that 
qualified under the stronger variable.   
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 Since there are two variables measuring each of these aspects, they can be combined into 
one without significantly affecting the regression.  The following new variables represent 
combinations of two variables listed in the model section. 
 Price stability as a written goal of the central bank (PSTAB):  PSTAB measures whether 
or not price stability is a written goal for the central bank, regardless of who defines price 
stability.  It is 1 when either PSTBK or PSTGT is 1.   
 Policy formed with government as a non voting member (PFNV2): PFNV2 measures 
whether a government representative has a vote in the regular policy meeting or not, regardless 
of whether or not he has a seat.  It is 1 when either PFMID or PFMNV  
is 1.   
 For appointment procedures, I think the relevant measure is whether or not the 
government is involved in any way with the appointment, which is already measured by GAPBK 
and BABPK.  They are both 1 when the government is not involved at all.  Thus, GAPMX and 
BAPMX are simply dropped from alternate regressions. 
 Second, the variables for the governor and the board are both meant to measure the effect 
of each bank’s top management.  Assuming that the most significant effect comes from the 
governor alone, board variables can be dropped with little effect. 
 Third, the remaining instrument independence variables are in three subgroups – 
governor tenure (GTERM and GTURN), policy formation (GDISS, PFNV2, and PPROV), and 
government financing (LMAND, LRATE, LTIME and LSIZE).  One variable from each 
subgroup might be sufficient to capture the effects of each group.  Assuming that LMAND and 
LRATE do not contribute as significantly to the government financing group, there are twelve 
possible combinations of the one variable from each of the three subgroups. 
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 Thus, there are four types of regressions that might explain how the aspects of central 
bank independence relate to inflation, gross domestic product, and unemployment.  Type 1 is the 
regression with all variables included.  Type 2 is the regression with the double variables 
combined.  Type 3 is the regression with the double variables combined and the board variables 
dropped.  Type 4 regressions are those with one variable to represent charter goals, governor 
appointments, governor tenure, policy formation, and government financing. 
 Table 3 summarizes the VIF scores for each of the four types of regressions.  Among the 
twelve Type 4 regressions, there was little difference in their VIF scores and estimated 
coefficients.  I have included the regression that includes the variables I feel to be most important 
in these regressions – PSTAB, GAPBK, GTURN, PFVN2 and LSIZE. 
Table 3. – Multicolinearity Among the Yearly Regressions 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
bapbk 17.70 ltime 6.83 ltime 4.32 pfnv2 1.91 
pstgt 12.23 pfnv2 5.36 lmand 3.34 lsize 1.78 
ltime 10.75 pstab 5.23 pstab 3.20 pstab 1.54 
bapmx 10.41 bapbk 4.17 pfnv2 2.61 gturn 1.06 
pstbk 7.53 lsize 3.42 pprov 2.57 gapbk 1.02 
pprov 7.31 lmand 3.35 lrate 2.52   
lmand 7.09 bterm 3.30 lsize 2.38   
pfmid 6.28 lrate 3.15 gdiss 1.99   
bterm 5.68 gdiss 3.12 gterm 1.42   
gapmx 5.63 pprov 2.58 gturn 1.18   
lsize 5.12 gterm 2.19 gapbk 1.17   
gdiss 4.58 gapbk 1.42     
gterm 3.62 gturn 1.25     
lrate 3.20       
pfmnv 2.97       
gapbk 2.08       
gturn 1.29       
Mean VIF 6.68 Mean VIF 3.49 Mean VIF 2.43 Mean VIF 1.46 
# VIF >5 11 # VIF >5 3 # VIF >5 0 # VIF >5 0 
 
 Type 2 regressions show less multicolinearity than Type 1, but a few variables still have 
high VIF scores.  Type 3 and 4 regressions have no multicolinearity.  However, Type 4 
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regressions have very low R
2
 values, indicating that too many independence variables are 
missing to accurately explain the real macroeconomic effects.  For complete regressions results, 
refer to the appendix.   
 Thus, the Type 3 regressions appear to offer the best explanation for how central bank 
independence affects inflation, gross domestic product, and unemployment.  As a whole, they 
explain about one-third of the changes in the macroeconomic variables.  Several estimated 
coefficients are highly significant and most are in the hypothesized direction.  The results from 
the Type 3 regression are summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4. – Type 3 Regressions with Yearly Data 
 Inflation Variance 
  
Inflation 
Rate Average 0.02 0.00 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Unemployment 
Rate 
pstab -0.0113*  0.0274***  0.0016*  0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0045 
gapbk -0.0050 -0.0039 -0.0007 -0.0009  0.0058  0.0055 
gterm -0.0016* -0.0041*** -0.0005*** -0.0006***  0.0006  0.0026*** 
gturn -0.0010* -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001  0.0002 -0.0011** 
gdiss 0.0144**  0.0178***  0.0028**  0.0034*** -0.0069** -0.0532*** 
pfnv2 -0.0314*** -0.0383*** -0.0058*** -0.0070***  0.0034 -0.0152** 
pprov -0.0030  0.0021 -0.0007 -0.0008  0.0030  0.0193*** 
lmand -0.0205***  0.0018 -0.0021** -0.0029*** -0.0041  0.0085 
lrate -0.0084 -0.0081** -0.0005 -0.0009  0.0046 -0.0112** 
ltime -0.0173* -0.0594*** -0.0063*** -0.0070***  0.0108** -0.0140 
lsize 0.0119  0.0382***  0.0042**  0.0046*** -0.0269***  0.0514*** 
constant 0.0960***  0.0468***  0.0100***  0.0134***  0.0414***  0.0795*** 
       
n 436 436 436 436 436 410 
R2 0.3409 0.4991 0.3352 0.3463 0.1543 0.2993 
Adj. R2 0.3238 0.4861 0.3180 0.3294 0.1323 0.2800 
F 14.17 34.97 14.93 15.29 7.52 15.93 
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 The most important results from these regressions are the Wald test values for the 
hypothesis 
  H0 :1 = 2 =L = 11.  The p-values for these F scores are all 0 carried out to four 
decimal places, strongly indicating that the effects of each aspect of independence are not the 
Note: A coefficient of 0.01 implies a 1% change from time t to time t+1.  F and P(F) list the observed F statistic and 
probability of measuring that F statistic associated with the hypothesis that all of the estimated coefficients are equal. 
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same.  In fact, this result holds for all regressions using yearly data, not just Type 3.  This means 
that an index that assumes that each aspect contributes equally to independence will distort the 
true independence of central banks. 
 Listing price stability as an explicit goal is estimated to reduce the overall inflation rate 
by about 1%.  Given that the constant rate of inflation, before the effects of independence are 
taken into account, is estimated here to be 9%, this is a significant finding.  Listing price stability 
as a goal also significantly increases the variance of the inflation rate around its average, 
indicating that the policy of a central bank with that objective will conflict with its government’s 
fiscal policy more often than that of a bank without it.  The remaining estimated coefficients for 
goal independence variables are not significant. 
 In addition to the goal independence variables, a few instrument independence variables 
have a significant effect on the inflation rate.  However, the governor’s statutory term length and 
effective term length, while statistically significant, are not far enough from zero to be 
economically significant.  Those that are significant, government involvement in policy-making, 
non-mandatory loans to the government, and limits on the length of government loans, most 
directly affect the government’s ability to influence monetary policy in the short run. 
 As for the inflation variance regressions, increasing the governor’s term length, forming 
policy without the government as a voting participant, and putting limits on the length of loans to 
the government are estimated to have significant effects in the hypothesized direction.  Table 5 
summarizes the estimated coefficients of variance converted to standard deviations.  To put these 
coefficients in perspective, their presence reduces the average difference from the average 
inflation rate by 6%, 19% and 24%, respectively.  However, I think these estimates seem large 
because the average inflation rate will be skewed upward by the few instances of high inflation, 
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so that the years in which inflation is low will be farther from the average.  The estimated 
constant standard deviation is 21% in the average variance regression, over twice the constant in 
the other two regressions. Thus, I assume an inflation target of 2% or 0% is a more reliable 
measure of the true variance.  In these cases, the estimated coefficients imply a standard 
deviation in the inflation rate of 2%, 8%, and 8%, respectively. 
Table 5. – Inflation Variance Coefficients in Standard Deviations 
 inflv infl2 infl0 
pstab 0.1655 0.0405 0.0345 
gapbk -0.0624 -0.0269 -0.0304 
gterm -0.0637 -0.0222 -0.0236 
gturn -0.0162 -0.0100 -0.0119 
gdiss 0.1335 0.0527 0.0579 
pfnv2 -0.1958 -0.0761 -0.0839 
pprov 0.0457 -0.0264 -0.0286 
lmand 0.0426 -0.0458 -0.0540 
lrate -0.0900 -0.0232 -0.0295 
ltime -0.2437 -0.0795 -0.0837 
lsize 0.1954 0.0645 0.0681 
constant 0.2163 0.0999 0.1158 
 
 The estimated effect of protecting the governor from dismissal is significant and in the 
opposite direction in all six of the regressions.  Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that I 
did not include a variable for whether or not a governor could be reappointed.  In cases where a 
government does not seek to exercise control over the governor by threatening to dismiss him, it 
could decide to achieve the same result by making the governor’s reappointment contingent upon 
his performance.  
 For the most part, independence does not have a significant effect on real GDP growth.  
Aside from governor dismissal, the only aspects of independence that have a significant effect 
are the limits on the time and size of loans to the government, of which only the size limit is in 
the expected direction.   
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 As for unemployment, governor term length, policy approval, and limits on loan size are 
significant and in the expected direction.  However, governor dismissal, government 
participation in policy-making, and limits on loan rates are significant in the opposite direction.  
Of these three, by far the biggest belongs to governor dismissal, which I have already explained 
suffers from a missing variable bias.  It is likely that this bias is skewing the results from the 
unemployment regression.   
Average Data 
 For the data set, I also calculated the average inflation rate, GDP growth rate, and 
unemployment for each bank.  I used the average data set to measure the effects of independence 
over the long run.  Just as with the yearly data, the average regressions also show signs of 
multicolinearity.  Table 6 summarizes the VIF scores for Type 1-4 regressions using the average 
dataset.  Just as with the yearly data, the Type 3 regressions are the most robust without 
exhibiting multicolinearity.  Table 8 summarizes the results of the Type 3 regressions using 
averages data.   
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Table 6. – Multicolinearity Among the Regressions with Average Data 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
bapmx 119.52 pstab 6.66 pfnv2 3.62 pfnv2 1.82 
pstgt 81.76 pfnv2 6.49 ltime 3.31 lsize 1.61 
ltime 45.02 bapbk 5.63 pstab 3.25 pstab 1.48 
pstbk 33.08 gdiss 5.48 lmand 3.23 gturn 1.24 
gturn 27.13 gterm 4.79 lrate 2.80 gapbk 1.07 
bapbk 22.81 lrate 4.62 lsize 2.19   
pfmid 22.71 lmand 4.07 gdiss 2.16   
gapmx 16.78 ltime 3.90 pprov 2.15   
pfmnv 15.51 gturn 3.80 gturn 1.81   
pprov 11.44 bterm 3.70 gterm 1.74   
gterm 6.62 pprov 3.28 gapbk 1.39   
bterm 6.39 lsize 2.83     
lmand 6.05 gapbk 2.36     
gapbk 5.92       
gdiss 5.77       
lrate 4.06       
lsize 3.66       
Mean VIF 25.54 Mean VIF 4.43 Mean VIF 2.51 Mean VIF 1.44 
# VIF > 5 15 # VIF > 5 4 # VIF > 5 0 # VIF > 5 0 
 
 It turns out that with using the averages data, almost none of the estimated coefficients 
are significant.  Not surprisingly, the p-values associated with the f scores from the test 
  H0 :1 = 2 =L = 11 are much higher.  It appears that as far as the long run is concerned, 
measuring independence with an index is just as good as analyzing the aspects separately; 
however, that result is trivial since independence would have no effect on macroeconomic 
variables either way.  
 The reader should note that the estimated coefficients are in the expected direction, just 
not significant.  These regressions still leave open the possibility that independence might be 
correlated with macroeconomic variables in the long run; however, they do not allow us draw 
any significant conclusions.  
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Table 8. – Type 3 Regressions with Average Data 
 Inflation Variance 
  
Inflation 
Rate Average 0.02 0.00 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Unemployment 
Rate 
pstab -0.0353 -0.0097 -0.0034 -0.0049  0.0039  0.0209 
gapbk  0.0071 -0.0073 -0.0004 -0.0001  0.0117  0.0341 
gterm -0.0022 -0.0062* -0.0007 -0.0008  0.0008  0.0063 
gturn -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0006  0.0009  0.0008 
gdiss  0.0207  0.0349*  0.0045  0.0054 -0.0084 -0.0934** 
pfnv2 -0.0147 -0.0067 -0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0017 -0.0411 
pprov -0.0037 -0.0152 -0.0026 -0.0028  0.0101  0.0518* 
lmand -0.0282 -0.0063 -0.0034 -0.0045 -0.0057  0.0111 
lrate -0.0121 -0.0191 -0.0014 -0.0019  0.0058 -0.0073 
ltime  0.0060 -0.0229 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0041 -0.0364 
lsize  0.0056  0.0350  0.0039  0.0041 -0.0308**  0.0370 
constant  0.1032**  0.0613*  0.0110*  0.0147**  0.0447***  0.0890 
       
n 24 24 24 24 24 23 
R2 0.6152 0.6530 0.6310 0.6266 0.5426 0.5648 
Adj. R2 0.2624 0.3350 0.2927 0.2843 0.1232 0.1295 
F 1.20 1.57 1.15 1.14 1.38 1.40 
P(F) 0.3795 0.2264 0.4014 0.4115 0.2932 0.2951 
# VIF >5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avg. VIF 2.510 2.510 2.510 2.510 2.510 2.480 
 
 Taking the regression results as a whole, the most significant finding of this paper is that 
there is a difference in how the aspects of central bank independence affect macroeconomic 
variables.  This means that measuring independence by an index, which assumes that all aspects 
carry equal weight distorts the true value of independence.  To illustrate this point, I have 
constructed an index using the averages data, a common measure of independence in previous 
research.  For details on how the index is constructed, refer to the appendix.  Chart 1 displays the 
correlation between the simple CBI index and the average inflation rate. 
 
 
Note: A coefficient of 0.01 implies a 1% change from time t to time t+1.  F and P(F) list the observed F statistic and 
probability of measuring that F statistic associated with the hypothesis that all of the estimated coefficients are equal. 
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Chart 1. – CBI Index and Inflation Rate 
 
 The chart does show a negative correlation between the total independence and the 
inflation rate, a result consistent with previous research.  However, the R
2
 value is only 0.3793, 
indicating only a decent fit.  When the index is weighted according to the estimated coefficients 
from the regressions, the fit improves to 0.5630.  Chart 2 displays the correlation between the 
weighted CBI index and the inflation rate. Not only does the fit improve when using the 
weighted index, the estimated effect of independence increases as well, from -0.0079 to -0.0117. 
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Chart 2. – Weighted CBI Index and Inflation Rate 
  
 From these results, it appears that independence is effective in the short run, but its effect, 
if there is one, decreases in the long run.  This might be for two reasons.  First, if the labor 
market is self-correcting, as assumed, then monetary policy can only affect it in the short run, 
when wages are fixed.  Thus, independence will have no effect on GDP growth and 
unemployment in the long run.  Second, during the time period used in the study, the M1 
velocity of money in the United States, as measured by nominal GDP over M1, varied between 6 
and 10 (see Chart 3).  The increase in velocity after the mid-nineties is most likely due to the rise 
of personal computers and the Internet, as well as an increased use of credit and debit cards, 
which allows business and consumers to manage their accounts and conduct transactions more 
easily.  This change in technology was a global phenomenon, so countries other than the U.S. 
most likely had similar changes in velocity.  Changes in velocity from year to year would disrupt 
a central bank’s ability to control the price level.  Thus, over the short run, when the velocity is 
fixed, the central bank has a strong influence on the price level.  In the long run, when velocity 
fluctuates, the central bank has less of an influence on the price level. 
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Chart 3. – United States M1 Velocity, 1981-2006 
 
 The weighted index indicates that there might be a correlation between independence and 
inflation in the long run, while the regressions indicate that each individual aspect of 
independence is not correlated with inflation. Thus, I believe further study is needed in this area.   
CONCLUSIONS 
 Future papers on this topic should seek to have larger samples than the one in this paper.  
Unfortunately, the time constraints of this project placed limits on the size of the sample I could 
take.  The small sample increased the likelihood of mulitcoliniarity between the independent 
variables, which makes it more difficult to measure the effect of one aspect while holding the 
others constant.  The larger the sample, the more likely it will be to find a significant result, 
especially with data for country averages.   
 The countries in this sample were mostly developed countries in Europe and the Western 
world.  I attempted to include more developing countries in the sample, but hyperinflation in 
those countries during the sample time period caused them to be extreme outliers.  The effects of 
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independence might be different in developed and developing countries.  A future paper with a 
broader sample should analyze independence in developed and developing countries, both 
together and in separate groups.  
 The variables and data can be adjusted more to fit the peculiarities of each central bank.  
This initial attempt took a lot of simplifying assumptions about the data and made a modest, but 
ultimately negligible attempt to measure how the actual values of each central bank changed 
from year to year.  Forming monetary policy is ultimately part of a political process, which 
depends on those involved in the process – central bank officials, government officials, and the 
voting public – as well as the institutional structures of the central banks and governments 
involved.  This political process will fluctuate from year to year and should ultimately change the 
levels of a central bank’s independence. 
 In this paper, I had hoped to be able to conclude which aspects of independence had the 
greatest effects on inflation, gross domestic product, and unemployment.  Due to the problems 
with my data outlined above, I feel that making any such claim at this point would be premature.  
However, I do believe that my method of analyzing the aspects independence separately is 
correct.  Hypothesis tests show without a doubt what is a very intuitive point: not all aspects of 
independence have the same effect on macroeconomic variables.  Future papers with more robust 
data sets and models should be able to draw more precise conclusions about exactly how 
different these effects are. 
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Appendix Table 1. - Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients
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PSTBK -0.40 -0.22 -0.02 -0.22 -0.02 0.11 0.09 -0.40 0.10 0.27 -0.08 0.37 0.00 0.04 0.25 -0.30
PSTGT -0.40 0.56 0.26 -0.05 0.39 -0.11 -0.11 0.28 -0.09 0.30 -0.18 -0.50 0.12 0.04 0.18 0.12
GAPBK -0.22 0.56 -0.13 0.11 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 0.17 0.10 0.17 -0.10 -0.28 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.07
GAPMX -0.02 0.26 -0.13 0.15 0.65 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.15 -0.02 0.20 -0.06 -0.08 -0.23 -0.20 0.24
BAPBK -0.22 -0.05 0.11 0.15 -0.27 0.19 0.35 0.02 0.23 -0.04 0.15 -0.09 -0.31 -0.20 -0.59 -0.20
BAPMX -0.02 0.39 -0.02 0.65 -0.27 0.00 0.06 0.32 -0.08 0.02 0.29 -0.15 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 0.21
GTERM 0.11 -0.11 -0.10 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.51 -0.16 0.29 0.26 -0.04 0.05 -0.16 0.07 -0.42 -0.26
BTERM 0.09 -0.11 -0.19 0.05 0.35 0.06 0.51 0.45 0.36 0.25 0.07 0.35 0.04 0.25 -0.13 -0.24
GTURN -0.40 0.28 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.32 -0.16 0.45 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.31
GDISS 0.10 -0.09 0.10 0.15 0.23 -0.08 0.29 0.36 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.19 0.38 0.33 -0.03 0.09
PFMID 0.27 0.30 0.17 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.26 0.25 0.13 0.10 -0.43 0.21 -0.14 0.04 0.08 0.17
PFMNV -0.08 -0.18 -0.10 0.20 0.15 0.29 -0.04 0.07 0.09 0.03 -0.43 0.13 0.00 0.06 -0.15 0.18
PPROV 0.37 -0.50 -0.28 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 0.05 0.35 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.27 0.27 0.25
LMAND 0.00 0.12 0.19 -0.08 -0.31 -0.06 -0.16 0.04 0.08 0.38 -0.14 0.00 0.10 0.66 0.52 0.12
LRATE 0.04 0.04 0.15 -0.23 -0.20 -0.03 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.33 0.04 0.06 0.27 0.66 0.29 0.19
LTIME 0.25 0.18 0.10 -0.20 -0.59 -0.09 -0.42 -0.13 0.15 -0.03 0.08 -0.15 0.27 0.52 0.29 0.10
LSIZE -0.30 0.12 0.07 0.24 -0.20 0.21 -0.26 -0.24 0.31 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.12 0.19 0.10
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Average 0.02 0.00
pstbk -0.027342***  0.025529*** 0.000347 -0.000747
[0.0082] [0.0046] [0.0012] [0.0015]
pstgt -0.031492** -0.011898 -0.005630** -0.006890**
[0.0159] [0.0089] [0.0023] [0.0029]
gapbk -0.022923 -0.054380*** -0.005932*** -0.006849**
[0.0151] [0.0084] [0.0022] [0.0027]
gapmx  0.012249* -0.023210*** -0.00135 -0.00086
[0.0070] [0.0039] [0.0010] [0.0012]
bapbk  0.092845***  0.148922***  0.020909***  0.024623***
[0.0211] [0.0119] [0.0031] [0.0038]
bapmx  0.016322  0.053772***  0.006645***  0.007298***
[0.0108] [0.0060] [0.0016] [0.0019]
gterm  0.002319*  0.001218*  0.000344*  0.000436*
[0.0012] [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.0002]
bterm -0.003927*** -0.006901*** -0.000941*** -0.001098***
[0.0013] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0002]
gturn -0.000870* -0.000177 -0.000074 -0.000109
[0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0000] [0.0000]
gdiss -0.010648 -0.022201*** -0.002945** -0.003371**
[0.0082] [0.0046] [0.0012] [0.0015]
pfmid -0.017023** -0.006506 -0.001796 -0.002477*
[0.0075] [0.0042] [0.0011] [0.0013]
pfmnv -0.038742*** -0.065317*** -0.008500*** -0.010050***
[0.0069] [0.0038] [0.0010] [0.0012]
pprov  0.004802  0.003379 -0.001299 -0.001107
[0.0082] [0.0046] [0.0012] [0.0015]
lmand -0.020120**  0.029660***  0.000672 -0.000133
[0.0079] [0.0044] [0.0011] [0.0014]
lrate  0.007508 -0.000331  0.001272  0.001572
[0.0054] [0.0030] [0.0008] [0.0010]
ltime  0.029652** -0.008458  0.003327*  0.004513*
[0.0131] [0.0073] [0.0019] [0.0024]
lsize -0.017087  0.029134***  0.002375  0.001692
[0.0110] [0.0062] [0.0016] [0.0020]
Constant  0.067697***  0.000019  0.001848  0.004156
[0.0157] [0.0088] [0.0023] [0.0028]
n 436 436 436 436
R
2
0.4642 0.6824 0.446 0.4625
Adj. R
2
0.4424 0.6695 0.4235 0.4407
F 17.86 50.39 16.97 17.96
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# VIF >5 11 11 11 11
Avg. VIF 6.68 6.68 6.68 6.68
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 2 - Type 1 Regressions, Yearly Data
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance
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Appendix Table 2 (continued) - Type 1 Regressions, Yearly Data
pstbk -0.015017*** -0.023483***
[0.0051] [0.0083]
pstgt -0.017881* -0.047180***
[0.0099] [0.0164]
gapbk  0.014841  0.0184
[0.0094] [0.0157]
gapmx  0.009791**  0.008254
[0.0044] [0.0075]
bapbk -0.000956  0.043549**
[0.0132] [0.0216]
bapmx  0.002631  0.039490***
[0.0067] [0.0112]
gterm  0.000462  0.004062***
[0.0007] [0.0012]
bterm -0.000231 -0.002359
[0.0008] [0.0014]
gturn  0.000123 -0.001683***
[0.0003] [0.0005]
gdiss -0.007393 -0.060761***
[0.0051] [0.0087]
pfmid  0.008258* -0.005981
[0.0047] [0.0078]
pfmnv  0.001174 -0.033114***
[0.0043] [0.0070]
pprov  0.002974  0.023457***
[0.0051] [0.0086]
lmand -0.006032  0.015998*
[0.0049] [0.0086]
lrate  0.007075** -0.011872**
[0.0034] [0.0059]
ltime  0.015207*  0.010655
[0.0082] [0.0139]
lsize -0.039290***  0.031075**
[0.0069] [0.0126]
Constant  0.050856***  0.076265***
[0.0098] [0.0167]
n 436 410
R
2
0.1875 0.4092
Adj. R
2
0.1545 0.3836
F 5.94 16.09
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000
# VIF >5 11 10
Avg. VIF 6.68 6.49
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Unemployment 
Rate
Real GDP 
Growth
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Appendix Table 3 - Type 2 Regressions, Yearly Data
Average 0.02 0.00
pstab 0.000448 0.043983*** 0.003639*** 0.003657***
[0.0075] [0.0046] [0.0011] [0.0013]
gapbk -0.020706 -0.00641 -0.002353 -0.003181
[0.0131] [0.0081] [0.0019] [0.0024]
bapbk 0.066975*** 0.042960*** 0.008659*** 0.011338***
[0.0108] [0.0066] [0.0016] [0.0019]
gterm 0.002330** -0.001338** 0.000026 0.00012
[0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0001] [0.0001]
bterm -0.000327 0.001785*** 0.000064 0.000051
[0.0011] [0.0006] [0.0001] [0.0002]
gturn -0.00059 -0.000143 -0.000053 -0.000076
[0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0000] [0.0000]
gdiss -0.012513* -0.004325 -0.000966 -0.001466
[0.0071] [0.0044] [0.0010] [0.0013]
pfnv2 -0.042106*** -0.056252*** -0.007755*** -0.009440***
[0.0080] [0.0049] [0.0012] [0.0014]
pprov -0.002448 0.002884 -0.000605 -0.000702
[0.0051] [0.0031] [0.0007] [0.0009]
lmand -0.019730*** 0.002428 -0.001999** -0.002788***
[0.0057] [0.0035] [0.0008] [0.0010]
lrate 0.007144 0.001548 0.001453* 0.001739*
[0.0057] [0.0035] [0.0008] [0.0010]
ltime 0.006442 -0.052157*** -0.003679** -0.003421*
[0.0110] [0.0068] [0.0016] [0.0020]
lsize 0.018152* 0.052193*** 0.005500*** 0.006227***
[0.0095] [0.0058] [0.0014] [0.0017]
Constant 0.048159*** 0.007478 0.003323* 0.004849**
[0.0121] [0.0075] [0.0018] [0.0022]
n 436 436 436 436
R
2
0.4016 0.57 0.3861 0.4018
Adj. R
2
0.3832 0.5568 0.3671 0.3834
F 17.8 40.16 16.86 17.86
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# VIF >5 3 3 3 3
Avg. VIF 3.49 3.49 3.49 3.49
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance
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Appendix Table 3 (continued) - Type 2 Regressions, Yearly Data
pstab -0.002715 0.000355
[0.0045] [0.0079]
gapbk 0.006396 0.013636
[0.0079] [0.0138]
bapbk 0.001672 -0.011173
[0.0065] [0.0118]
gterm 0.000734 0.002034*
[0.0006] [0.0011]
bterm 0.000243 0.001541
[0.0006] [0.0011]
gturn 0.000193 -0.001300**
[0.0003] [0.0005]
gdiss -0.008163* -0.052072***
[0.0043] [0.0082]
pfnv2 0.001732 -0.021600**
[0.0048] [0.0085]
pprov 0.003045 0.019558***
[0.0031] [0.0054]
lmand -0.004104 0.008747
[0.0034] [0.0062]
lrate 0.004954 -0.014119**
[0.0034] [0.0063]
ltime 0.010429 -0.024070**
[0.0066] [0.0118]
lsize -0.025494*** 0.058588***
[0.0057] [0.0115]
Constant 0.039143*** 0.080245***
[0.0073] [0.0135]
n 436 410
R
2
0.1549 0.3029
Adj. R
2
0.1288 0.2800
F 6.34 13.05
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000
# VIF >5 3 2
Avg. VIF 3.49 3.32
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Real GDP 
Growth
Unemployment 
Rate
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Appendix Table 4 - Type 3 Regressions, Yearly Data
Average 0.02 0.00
pstab -0.011279*  0.027394***  0.001641*  0.00119
[0.0062] [0.0039] [0.0009] [0.0011]
gapbk -0.004985 -0.003897 -0.000722 -0.000922
[0.0124] [0.0079] [0.0018] [0.0022]
gterm -0.001618* -0.004060*** -0.000494*** -0.000559***
[0.0008] [0.0005] [0.0001] [0.0001]
gturn -0.001018* -0.000261 -0.0001 -0.000141
[0.0005] [0.000337] [0.0000] [0.0000]
gdiss  0.014427**  0.017830***  0.002776***  0.003353***
[0.0059] [0.0038] [0.0008] [0.0010]
pfnv2 -0.031434*** -0.038345*** -0.005788*** -0.007045***
[0.0058] [0.0037] [0.0008] [0.0010]
pprov -0.002975  0.002092 -0.000697 -0.000816
[0.0053] [0.0034] [0.0008] [0.0009]
lmand -0.020453***  0.001811 -0.002101** -0.002919***
[0.0060] [0.0038] [0.0008] [0.0010]
lrate -0.008361 -0.008106** -0.000536 -0.000871
[0.0053] [0.0034] [0.0007] [0.0009]
ltime -0.017259* -0.059394*** -0.006320*** -0.007010***
[0.0091] [0.0058] [0.0013] [0.0016]
lsize  0.011878  0.038199***  0.004160***  0.004635***
[0.0083] [0.0052] [0.0012] [0.0015]
Constant  0.096043***  0.046804***  0.009971***  0.013413***
[0.0099] [0.0063] [0.0014] [0.0018]
n 436 436 436 436
R
2
0.3409 0.4991 0.3352 0.3463
Adj. R
2
0.3238 0.4861 0.3180 0.3294
F 14.17 34.97 14.93 15.29
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# VIF >5 0 0 0 0
Avg. VIF 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance
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Appendix Table 4 (continued) - Type 3 Regressions, Yearly Data
pstab -0.004149 -0.004455
[0.0035] [0.0062]
gapbk  0.005835  0.005449
[0.0071] [0.0125]
gterm  0.000612  0.002567***
[0.0004] [0.0008]
gturn  0.000202 -0.001109**
[0.0003] [0.0005]
gdiss -0.006877** -0.053170***
[0.0034] [0.0062]
pfnv2  0.003391 -0.015223**
[0.0033] [0.0059]
pprov  0.002975  0.019279***
[0.0030] [0.0054]
lmand -0.004142  0.008534
[0.0034] [0.0062]
lrate  0.004604 -0.011156**
[0.0030] [0.0055]
ltime  0.010840** -0.014013
[0.0052] [0.0093]
lsize -0.026905***  0.051420***
[0.0047] [0.0103]
Constant  0.041422***  0.079512***
[0.0057] [0.0119]
n 436 410
R
2
0.1543 0.2993
Adj. R
2
0.1323 0.2800
F 7.52 15.93
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000
# VIF >5 0 0
Avg. VIF 2.43 2.25
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Unemployment 
Rate
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Real GDP 
Growth
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Appendix Table 5 - Type 4 Regressions, Yearly Data
Average 0.02 0.00
pstab -0.025859*** -0.005511 -0.002444*** -0.003478***  0.001981 -0.015323***
[0.0046] [0.0035] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0025] [0.0047]
gapbk -0.010521  0.000732 -0.000284 -0.000705  0.001398 -0.018698
[0.0126] [0.0095] [0.0019] [0.0023] [0.0068] [0.0128]
gturn -0.000866 -0.000546 -0.000118 -0.000152  0.000263 -0.001344**
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0005]
pfnv2 -0.022583*** -0.025290*** -0.003788*** -0.004692***  0.001485 -0.006508
[0.0054] [0.0041] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0029] [0.0055]
lsize -0.003701  0.024841***  0.001638  0.00149 -0.022920***  0.052886***
[0.0078] [0.0059] [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0042] [0.0101]
Constant  0.082291***  0.00884  0.005590***  0.008482***  0.044789***  0.048705***
[0.0074] [0.0056] [0.0011] [0.0014] [0.0040] [0.0099]
n 436 436 436 436 436 410
R
2
0.2083 0.1522 0.1436 0.1630 0.1065 0.1385
Adj. R
2
0.1991 0.1424 0.1337 0.1532 0.0961 0.1278
F 23.97 17.34 15.35 17.77 12.62 15.08
P(F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# VIF >5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Avg. VIF 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.30
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance Real GDP 
Growth
Unemployment 
Rate
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Appendix Table 6 - Type 1 Regressions, Average Data
Average 0.02 0.00
pstbk -0.000719  0.027254 -0.000651 -0.00068
[0.0320] [0.0160] [0.0031] [0.0042]
pstgt  0.042984  0.025319 -0.005017 -0.003298
[0.0751] [0.0375] [0.0074] [0.0100]
gapbk -0.047648 -0.050420** -0.005849 -0.007755
[0.0334] [0.0167] [0.0033] [0.0044]
gapmx -0.007998 -0.011305 -0.00389 -0.00421
[0.0238] [0.0119] [0.0023] [0.0032]
bapbk  0.174912**  0.183399***  0.032834***  0.039831***
[0.0567] [0.0283] [0.0056] [0.0075]
bapmx  0.029487  0.041616  0.013827*  0.015006
[0.0666] [0.0333] [0.0066] [0.0089]
gterm  0.008000**  0.004376**  0.000965**  0.001285**
[0.0029] [0.0014] [0.0002] [0.0004]
bterm -0.003439 -0.004622** -0.000961** -0.001099**
[0.0030] [0.0015] [0.0003] [0.0004]
gturn -0.001067 -0.000482 -0.000657 -0.0007
[0.0049] [0.0024] [0.0004] [0.0006]
gdiss -0.028082 -0.021696** -0.003676* -0.004799*
[0.0162] [0.0081] [0.0016] [0.0021]
pfmid -0.040907 -0.025043 -0.002283 -0.003919
[0.0265] [0.0132] [0.0026] [0.0035]
pfmnv -0.057714* -0.056260*** -0.011979*** -0.014287**
[0.0290] [0.0145] [0.0028] [0.0038]
pprov  0.054638**  0.024522**  0.002935  0.005121*
[0.0192] [0.0095] [0.0019] [0.0025]
lmand -0.024121  0.006081 -0.001098 -0.002063
[0.0135] [0.0067] [0.0013] [0.0018]
lrate  0.026532*  0.018119**  0.004010**  0.005072**
[0.0112] [0.0056] [0.00111 [0.0015]
ltime -0.002756 -0.017494  0.005811  0.005701
[0.0495] [0.0247] [0.0049] [0.0066]
lsize -0.050432** -0.004557 -0.002409 -0.004426
[0.0190] [0.0095] [0.0018] [0.0025]
Constant  0.055863* -0.002751  0.001281  0.003116
[0.0267] [0.0133] [0.0026] [0.0035]
n 24 24 24 24
R
2
0.9568 0.9868 0.9784 0.9755
Adj. R
2
0.8345 0.9495 0.917 0.9061
F 6.75 24.53 13.19 11.64
P(F) 0.0132 0.0004 0.0022 0.0031
# VIF >5 15 15 15 15
Avg. VIF 25.54 25.54 25.54 25.54
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance
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Appendix Table 6 (continued) - Type 1 Regressions, Average Data
pstbk  0.008893  0.110574
[0.0275] [0.1403]
pstgt  0.037335  0.220169
[0.0644] [0.3243]
gapbk -0.000622 -0.070443
[0.0287] [0.1414]
gapmx  0.00079 -0.031764
[0.0205] [0.1006]
bapbk  0.002541  0.110679
[0.0486] [0.2408]
bapmx -0.011019 -0.055402
[0.0572] [0.2828]
gterm  0.001191  0.014751
[0.0025] [0.0133]
bterm  0.000875  0.0004
[0.0026] [0.0129]
gturn  0.001011  0.008617
[0.0042] [0.0212]
gdiss -0.010547 -0.137637
[0.0139] [0.0769]
pfmid -0.007331 -0.09634
[0.0228] [0.1160]
pfmnv -0.004553 -0.05514
[0.0249] [0.1220]
pprov  0.023319  0.117537
[0.0164] [0.0837]
lmand -0.007722  0.019812
[0.0116] [0.0590]
lrate  0.009737  0.013151
[0.0096] [0.0546]
ltime -0.020141 -0.128414
[0.0424] [0.2110]
lsize -0.041481** -0.000079
[0.0163] [0.1054]
Constant  0.051916*  0.047882
[0.0229] [0.1163]
n 24 23
R
2
0.7013 0.676
Adj. R
2
-0.1452 -0.4255
F 0.87 0.63
P(F) 0.6235 0.7786
# VIF >5 15 16
Avg. VIF 25.54 26.02
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
Real GDP 
Growth
Unemployment 
Rate
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix Table 7 - Type 2 Regressions, Average Data
Average 0.02 0.00
pstab  0.023233  0.047198**  0.005334*  0.006264
[0.0247] [0.0168] [0.0028] [0.003770]
gapbk -0.027595 -0.046231* -0.006507 -0.00761
[0.0334] [0.0228] [0.0039] [0.005105]
bapbk  0.145497***  0.146271***  0.022643***  0.028462***
[0.0446] [0.0304] [0.0052] [0.006808]
gterm  0.008462*  0.004456  0.000966*  0.001304*
[0.0040] [0.0027] [0.0004] [0.000614]
bterm -0.001966 -0.002843 -0.000453 -0.000532
[0.0036] [0.0025] [0.0004] [0.000560]
gturn  0.003551  0.00361  0.000495  0.000638
[0.0029] [0.0020] [0.0003] [0.000448]
gdiss -0.045073 -0.030022 -0.005476* -0.007279*
[0.0250] [0.01710 [0.0029] [0.003829]
pfnv2 -0.052694* -0.041238** -0.007264** -0.009372**
[0.0243] [0.0166] [0.0028] [0.003722]
pprov  0.026996  0.015789  0.002195  0.003275
[0.0162] [0.0110] [0.0019] [0.002483]
lmand -0.014322  0.009072 -0.000994 -0.001567
[0.0175] [0.0119] [0.0020] [0.002678]
lrate  0.028082  0.020469  0.004685*  0.005808*
[0.0189] [0.0129] [0.0022] [0.002896]
ltime -0.022141 -0.049793** -0.004488 -0.005374
[0.0230] [0.0157] [0.0027] [0.003519]
lsize -0.022346  0.005069 -0.000791 -0.001685
[0.0264] [0.0180] [0.0031] [0.004043]
Constant  0.027638 -0.012125 -0.00035  0.000355
[0.0360] [0.0245] [0.0042] [0.005499]
n 24 24 24 24
R
2
0.8198 0.8976 0.8742 0.8672
Adj. R
2
0.5855 0.7645 0.7107 0.6945
F 2.92 6.08 4.24 4
P(F) 0.0498 0.0038 0.0145 0.0178
# VIF >5 4 4 4 4
Avg. VIF 4.430 4.430 4.430 4.430
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance
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Appendix Table 7 (continued) - Type 2 Regressions, Average Data
pstab  0.006758  0.054966
[0.0125] [0.0673]
gapbk  0.016951  0.042165
[0.0169] [0.0755]
bapbk  0.000724  0.055637
[0.0226] [0.1160]
gterm  0.001012  0.011449
[0.0020] [0.0109]
bterm  0.001145  0.002959
[0.0018] [0.0084]
gturn  0.000693  0.002725
[0.0014] [0.0070]
gdiss -0.01039 -0.130118
[0.0127] [0.0726]
pfnv2 -0.006695 -0.076086
[0.0123] [0.0675]
pprov  0.01008  0.065237
[0.0082] [0.0402]
lmand -0.00753  0.00398
[0.0089] [0.0419]
lrate  0.007076  0.018486
[0.0096] [0.0555]
ltime -0.006031 -0.053883
[0.0117] [0.0548]
lsize -0.028473*  0.012137
[0.0134] [0.0835]
Constant  0.040892**  0.070063
[0.0182] [0.0815]
n 24 23
R
2
0.5631 0.5850
Adj. R
2
-0.0049 -0.0145
F 1.06 1.02
P(F) 0.4726 0.4968
# VIF >5 4 6
Avg. VIF 4.430 5.690
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Real GDP 
Growth
Unemployment 
Rate
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Average 0.02 0.00
pstab -0.035277 -0.009675 -0.003441 -0.004852
[0.0230] [0.0197] [0.0031] [0.0040]
gapbk  0.007054 -0.007349 -0.000428 -0.000145
[0.0341] [0.0293] [0.0046] [0.0059]
gterm -0.00223 -0.006206** -0.000683 -0.000773
[0.0032] [0.0027] [0.0004] [0.0005]
gturn -0.002639 -0.00276 -0.000493 -0.000598
[0.0027] [0.0023] [0.0003] [0.0004]
gdiss  0.020707  0.034864*  0.00455  0.005378
[0.0210] [0.0180] [0.0028] [0.0036]
pfnv2 -0.014695 -0.006679 -0.001968 -0.002556
[0.0243] [0.0208] [0.0033] [0.0042]
pprov -0.003717 -0.015191 -0.002602 -0.002751
[0.0175] [0.0151] [0.0024] [0.0030]
lmand -0.028227 -0.006336 -0.0034 -0.004529
[0.0208] [0.0179] [0.0028] [0.0036]
lrate -0.012112 -0.019116 -0.00143 -0.001915
[0.0196] [0.0169] [0.0027] [0.0034]
ltime  0.005983 -0.022854 -0.000338 -0.000099
[0.02835 [0.0243] [0.0038] [0.0049]
lsize  0.005609  0.035013  0.003872  0.004096
[0.0310] [0.0266] [0.0042] [0.0054]
Constant  0.103216**  0.061281*  0.010975*  0.014703**
[0.0371] [0.0318] [0.0050] [0.0065]
n 24 24 24 24
R
2
0.6152 0.6530 0.6310 0.6266
Adj. R
2
0.2624 0.3350 0.2927 0.2843
F 1.20 1.57 1.15 1.14
P(F) 0.3795 0.2264 0.4014 0.4115
# VIF >5 0 0 0 0
Avg. VIF 2.510 2.510 2.510 2.510
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 8 - Type 3 Regressions, Average Data
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance
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Appendix Table 8 (continued) - Type 3 Regressions, Average Data
pstab  0.003874  0.020933
[0.0081] [0.0362]
gapbk  0.011734  0.034065
[0.0121] [0.0536]
gterm  0.000843  0.006308
[0.0011] [0.0051]
gturn  0.000859  0.000789
[0.0009] [0.0042]
gdiss -0.008408 -0.093421**
[0.0074] [0.0344]
pfnv2 -0.001659 -0.041079
[0.0086] [0.0387]
pprov  0.010066  0.051891*
[0.0062] [0.0275]
lmand -0.005699  0.011092
[0.0074] [0.0343]
lrate  0.005782 -0.007269
[0.0070] [0.0329]
ltime -0.004115 -0.036369
[0.0100] [0.0441]
lsize -0.030784**  0.037035
[0.0110] [0.0619]
Constant  0.044694***  0.089027
[0.0132] [0.0684]
n 24 23
R
2
0.5426 0.5648
Adj. R
2
0.1232 0.1295
F 1.38 1.40
P(F) 0.2932 0.2951
# VIF >5 0 0
Avg. VIF 2.510 2.480
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Real GDP 
Growth
Unemployment 
Rate
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Average 0.02 0.00
pstab -0.036774** -0.011208 -0.003641 -0.005112*  0.001483 -0.013943
[0.0148] [0.0151] [0.0021] [0.0027] [0.0050] [0.0257]
gapbk -0.00351  0.007509  0.000895  0.000754  0.000818 -0.026951
[0.0301] [0.0307] [0.0043] [0.0054] [0.0103] [0.0520]
gturn -0.002109 -0.002694 -0.000431 -0.000515  0.000559 -0.000794
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0007] [0.0038]
pfnv2 -0.013276 -0.019197 -0.002867 -0.003399  0.003664 -0.002422
[0.0171] [0.0174] [0.0024] [0.0031] [0.0058] [0.0296]
lsize -0.004231  0.027431  0.002228  0.002058 -0.024700**  0.060832
[0.0267] [0.0271] [0.0038] [0.0048] [0.0091] [0.0577]
Constant  0.093603***  0.022922  0.007738*  0.011082**  0.041369***  0.043869
[0.0277] [0.0282] [0.0040] [0.0050] [0.0094] [0.0598]
n 24 24 24 24 24 23
R
2
0.4136 0.2242 0.3575 0.3741 0.3406 0.1177
Adj. R
2
0.2593 0.0200 0.1885 0.2094 0.1671 -0.1273
F 2.52 .84 1.68 1.87 2.45 .06
P(F) 0.0752 0.5180 0.1956 0.1564 0.0817 0.6700
# VIF >5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Avg. VIF 1.440 1.440 1.440 1.440 1.440 1.330
Standard errors in brackets, truncated at four decimal places
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A coefficient of 0.01 means a 1% increase
Real GDP 
Growth
Unemployment 
Rate
Appendix Table 9 - Type 4 Regressions, Average Data
Inflation Rate
Inflation Variance
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